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Notes on a Social Psychology of Thinking:  
A comparison of Bartlett and Moscovici 
 
 
BRADY WAGONER 
Aalborg University 
 
 
INTRODUCTION: FROM LOGIC TO EVERYDAY THINKING 
 
Psychologists have long had an interest in the study of thinking. However, it has typically been 
approached through rules of logic and association. As a result, scientific inference has been the 
standard by which all thinking is assessed and the logic puzzle (having a single solution arrived 
through abstract procedures) has been the paradigmatic ethod of study. Thinking in this 
perspective becomes an individual activity isolated from social influences and context. This 
approach has tended to focus on experimentally demonstrating thousands of ways in which 
human thinking is distorted or inaccurate, rather tan seeing it in situ. In this way, psychologists 
project their own scientific ways of thinking onto their subjects—committing what James (1890) 
called the ‘Psychologist’s Fallacy’ – rather than studying their subjects from within their own 
meaningful and heterogeneous lifeworlds. Let us consider Kahneman’s (2011) influential 
research on heuristics as an illustrative example of the standard psychological approach to 
thinking.  
In one famous experiment, Tversky and Kahneman (1982) gave subjects the following 
description: “Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in 
philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social 
Wagoner Notes on a Social Psychology of Thinking 
 
 
Papers on Social Representations, 21, 6.1.-6.14 (2012) [http://www.psych.lse.ac.uk/psr/] 
 
justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations”. They then asked whether it is more 
probable that “Linda is a bank teller” or “Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist 
movement”. 85% of their participants chose the second and therefore committed a logical fallacy, 
or did they? Gigerenzer (2005) has pointed out that “probable” is not here interpreted to mean 
mathematical probability but rather social plausibility. In other words, the meaning in everyday 
communication is different from that of scientific discourse. If the question is asked differently 
subjects do not commit the fallacy, thus demonstrating contextual sensitivity in thinking.   
An alternative approach to the study of thinking is to see it as an everyday social activity, 
on its own terms, within its own procedures and logic. Everyday thinking is an open process, 
which involves thinking through the frameworks of dif erent social groups, rather than adopting a 
single logical procedure. This approach brings us to the idea that, in a differentiated society, 
multiple frameworks of thought are available, a condition Moscovici (1976/2008) has called 
‘cognitive polyphasia’. Moreover, these do not remain in isolation from each other: they co-
develop, define each other in opposition, are influenced in various ways, borrow ideas and shun 
others.  
This paper intends to explore these qualities and dynamics of everyday thinking through 
the work of Frederic Bartlett and Serge Moscovici. In so doing, it will offer a comparison of their 
respective contributions and highlight points of actu l and potential influence from Bartlett to 
Moscovici. This comparison will revolve around three issues spread over Bartlett’s career: (1) the 
relation between ‘primitive’ and ‘advanced’ modes of thought; (2) the conventional character of 
thought and (3) constructive thinking as creative gap filling.  Through these comparisons I aim to 
advance tools for the further study of everyday thinking, in its polyphasic social dimensions.    
 
COMPARING CULTURES: PRIMITIVE MAN AND KANT 
 
An important early step in re-conceiving the psychology of thinking was made by the French 
anthropologist Lévy-Bruhl. In Moscovici’s (2001) words, “Lévy-Bruhl’s lifelong project was 
twofold: first, to explain the mentality of so-called ‘primitive’ people by social causes rather than 
individual causes, as Frazer (1922) had done; and second, to demystify western thought as 
privileged in comparison to other forms of thought” (p. 213). In so doing, Lévy-Bruhl relativized 
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the categories of the human mind, thus upsetting the widely held idea of psychological unity of 
humankind, according to which all people spontaneously begin with animistic explanations of 
nature due to the paucity of data at their disposal and later naturally progress to more 
sophisticated explanations. For Lévy-Bruhl primitive and civilized thought are qualitatively 
different forms of social thinking. The standards imposed by western anthropologists of logical 
truth and falsity should thus not be used to judge the thought processes of people living elsewhere 
in the world. In contrast to civilized persons, Lévy-Bruhl argued that primitive thought is 
characterized by the pre-logical, emotional, mystical and self-contradictory. Primitives do not 
sharply distinguish themselves from other objects, but rather emotionally participate with them.  
For example, members of a Brazilian tribe (the Boron ) claimed to be an arana (type of parrot) 
and human being at the same time; thus committing, from an analytic perspective, the logical 
error of contradiction. Lévy-Bruhl’s originality lies in treating primitive thinking positively rather 
than as simply a poor substitute for modern thinking.   
Lévy-Bruhl’s work was widely discussed in the 1910s and 1920s. Bartlett and his 
Cambridge mentor W.H.R. Rivers were sympathetic to his insistence on social over 
psychological explanations of primitive thought but were critical of the sharp separation he made 
between primitive and civilized modes of thought. As Lévy-Bruhl had done, Bartlett (1923) 
sharply opposed purely psychological explanations of primitive thought and cultural expression. 
Anthropologists and psychologists, for example, had explained the folk-story through deep-
seated individual needs, desires and wishes – in psychoanalysis these are the imaginative 
fulfillment of wishes. The general strategy of theorists was to search for an ‘absolute origin’ of 
the story in the mental processes of an individual, rather than to understand a story’s contents and 
function within a particular social community, its distinctive history and traditions. In contrast to 
this explanation, Bartlett (1923, pp. 12-13) argues that, “It is only if we interpret individual to 
mean pre-social that we can take psychology to be prehistoric. The truth is that there are some 
individual responses which simply do not occur outside a social group”. Thus, membership in a 
social group exerts a definite influence on the behavior and thought of any individual in it, 
whether they are telling a folk-story, participating in a ritual performance, painting a picture or 
involved in a hunt. Social groups always have normative ways of acting and thinking, regardless 
of whether individuals within them are self-consciously aware of them.  This, however, does not 
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mean that individuals are determined by the group’s ways of thinking (this point is less clear in 
Lévy-Bruhl’s account). Bartlett (1923) is very explicit that responses to the norm will vary, but 
that membership in a social group inevitably exerts an influence on behavior.  
Where Bartlett (1923) most explicitly deviates from Lévy-Bruhl is the latter’s strict 
separation of ‘primitive’ and ‘advanced’ forms of thought. According to Bartlett (1923, p. 289) 
“the error… is not that the primitive or abnormal are wrongly observed, but that the modern and 
normal are hardly observed at all”. Indeed, Lévy-Bruhl (1926) himself explicitly states that he 
plainly accepts how contemporary western thought has been characterized and focuses his energy 
on elucidating the thought processes of primitives. Yet, his contrast rests on ‘civilized’ thinking 
as operating according to the dictates of logic.  What Lévy-Bruhl ends up comparing is primitive 
man to a scientific expert rather than the everyday thinking of modern people. Similarly, 
Moscovici (2001, p. 248) recalls a meeting with Bartlett in the 1950s: “During our conversation 
he made a remark about Lévy-Bruhl, saying he was wrong to compare primitive man to Kant”.  
Secondly, Bartlett (1923) observed that there is variability in the primitive’s mode of 
thought, as a function of the topic considered (e.g., death, war, food, art), just as there is in 
contemporary societies. The same tendencies found in one can also be discovered in the other, 
though not necessarily in the same contexts in bothcultures. He takes the notion of causality as a 
case in point: “‘Causal links’ says Lévy-Bruhl, ‘whic  for us are the very essence of nature, the 
foundation of its reality and stability, have no interest’ for the primitive man: he is swayed by a 
‘kind of a priori over which experience exerts no ifluence’” (quoted in Bartlett, 1923, p. 289). 
Yet, examples of establishing links and not establishing links in a causal chain can be found in 
both the thinking of primitives and modern people. Thus, a diversity of forms of thought can be 
found in both cultures. Acknowledging this makes the s arp distinction between the two appear 
untenable. A student of Bartlett’s put the point eloquently: “the contention that civilized persons 
strive always to reach a well-balanced coherent conclusion, while the primitive is willing to 
tolerate incoherence and even ‘considerable contradic ions and contrasts’ is, if not unfair to the 
primitive, at least highly flattering to ourselves” (Carmichael, 1940, p. 313). 
 Instead of a sharp qualitative difference between primitive and modern thought, Bartlett 
argues for a quantitative one. In his words, “we come from complexity [in primitive thought] to 
yet greater complexity [in modern thought]” (Bartlett, 1923, p. 256). The increase in complexity 
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is due in the main to two factors: “the multiplication and division of specific groups, together 
with immense improvements in the mechanisms of inter-communication” (p. 256). Complexity 
for Bartlett and Rivers was a result of contact between social groups, which stimulates innovation 
and differentiation. This is already found in primitive groups but is further accelerated in modern 
society, creating new conditions for the free movement of thought and construction of new 
cultural forms. Bartlett (1923, 1932) calls this synthesis of ideas coming from diverse sources and 
stimulated by group contacts, ‘social constructiveness’. He even thought his own scientific theory 
was a good example of this (Bartlett, 1958, Ch. 8). In what follows I will explore some parallels 
with Moscovici’s (1976/2008) theory – focusing in particular on his hypothesis of cognitive 
polyphasia – and at the same time elucidate the next phase of Bartlett’s thought.   
 
THE DYNAMIC DIVERSITY OF THOUGHT 
 
In his famous Psychoanalysis: Its Image and its Public, Moscovici (1976/2008) aimed to re-
evaluate commonsense thinking by exploring how scientif c ideas are transformed as they 
become part of commonsense or public knowledge. Before this time, and perhaps to this day, 
there had been a tendency to consider commonsense thi king as a deficit or vulgarized form of 
thinking, assessed within the framework of scientific thinking. Instead, Moscovici understood 
and studied everyday thinking within its own logic and functions, as Lévy-Bruhl had done with 
primitive thought. Thus, he remapped Lévy-Bruhl’s di tinction between forms of thought onto 
the distinction between scientific and commonsense thinking in modern society, recognizing that 
the latter cannot be assessed within the logic of the former. At the same time, he incorporated 
Bartlett’s (1923) insight that one can find many different forms of thought in any given society 
and that this multiplicity of thinking is dynamic and developing through the interaction between 
different social groups. Furthermore, like Bartlett (1923), Moscovici (1976/2008) characterized 
modern societies as becoming increasingly differentiated into specialized social groups, each 
with its own specific mentality, which are within ever greater knowledge of one another through 
improvements in communication technology.  
In relation to this last point, it is worth quoting at length Moscovici’s introduction of the 
‘hypothesis’ of cognitive polyphasia: 
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With the growth of knowledge and social division wehave all become polyglots.  
Besides French, English or Russian we speak medical, psychological, technical, 
political languages, etc. We are probably witnessing a  analogous phenomenon in 
regard to thought.  In a global manner one can say th t the dynamic coexistence – 
interference or specialization – of the distinct modalities of knowledge, 
corresponding to definite relations between man and his environment, determines 
a state of cognitive polyphasia (…) Operative or formal judgments habitually 
represent one of these dominant terms in a field of personal and group 
preoccupations, while playing a subordinate role elsewhere. (Moscovici, 
1976/2008, pp. 190-191, emphasis in original) 
 
Cognitive polyphasia is a social condition in which different forms of thought (e.g., 
medical and religious explanations of madness – Wagner et al., 1999) co-exist in the same society 
and even in the same individual. This co-existence of cognitive systems is the rule rather than the 
exception. As such, studying thinking, as a function of inter-individual differences, will no longer 
do. For example, it will not be sufficient for social psychologists to say that an individual is rigid, 
dogmatic, intolerant and characterized by a closed m ntal system in general, as discussed in the 
Authoritarian Personality (Adorno et al., 1950): “It is perfectly conceivable that a dogmatic and 
rigid individual who uses what might be described as a closed cognitive system in the political or 
racial domain may be tolerant and open in his role as artist, scientist or student” (Moscovici, 
1976/2008, p. 186).  Moscovici (1976/2008) even went as far as to say that “an eighteenth-
century mechanist who was a follower of Newton was by definition a dogmatist because there 
was no scientific paradigm other than that created by the great English scientist” (p. 186). What is 
thus needed is a social psychology that connects up thinking with membership in different social 
groups, and thus allows us to track how a person’s thinking on a particular subject will change 
depending on the situation they are asked a question in. An individual’s thinking on a particular 
subject will likely vary as a function of whether they are asked as a professional doctor, church 
member or country club associate. These different forms of thought (i.e., social representations) 
are also likely to interpenetrate, influence and resist one another. Gillespie (2008), for example, 
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has outlined a number of “semantic barriers” indiviuals in Moscovici’s study (1976/2008) used 
to block influence from other groups’ social representations, which they are nonetheless aware of.    
Thus, different social groups in a society have distinctive ways of understanding the 
world (though an individual that is a member of multiple groups may mix the different group 
understandings in his or her own way). Each social group provides its members with values, 
beliefs and practices (i.e., social representations) for recognizing, acting on and communicating 
about aspects of their world. According to Moscovici (1981), the primary function of social 
representations is ‘to make the unfamiliar familiar’, which is a phrase he takes over directly from 
Bartlett (1932). In other words, anything new is seen and understood in terms of the old. As such, 
“memory tends to predominate over logic, the past over the present, the response over the stimuli 
and the image over the ‘reality’” (Moscovici, 1981, p. 189).  These dynamics of social thinking 
are contrasted with logic and scientific inference, where rigid procedures are designed to 
counteract these processes such that the familiar becomes unfamiliar. By contrast, “in social 
thought, conclusions have primacy over premises, and as Nelly Stephanie so aptly put it, ‘the 
verdict rather than the trail dominates our social relations’”. (Moscovici, 1981, p. 190). This is 
very close to Bartlett’s (1932) idea that psychological processes involve “an effort after meaning” 
whereby the material present always points beyond itself to a setting or scheme, which operates 
as an organized mass of previous experience giving form to the new material. In Gestalt terms, a 
figure can only appear against some ground, as in Rubin’s face-vase illusion. Like Moscovici, 
Bartlett also emphasized, that this ground has irreducible social dimensions to it and as such, 
understanding an individual’s functioning requires mbedding it within social life, in the 
traditions and beliefs of different groups the indivi ual participants in. In Moscovici’s (2001) 
words, “nobody’s mind is free from the effects of the prior conditioning which is imposed by his 
representations, language and culture” (p. 23). These social-psychological processes can begin to 
explain those aspects common to social thinking, which appear scandalous from the standpoint of 
science. For example, how it is that people see, int ract and coexist with ghosts, demons, jinns, 
saints and spirits. How the practice of magic, witchcraft and oracles has continued to be practiced 
by people for thousands of years all over the world.   
It is also interesting to note the parallel language both Bartlett and Moscovici use to 
describe the social-psychological dynamics of thinking. I have already noted the key phrase 
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“making the unfamiliar familiar” but there are many others (see also Saito, 2000, p. 170). 
Moscovici himself acknowledges the important role Bartlett’s (1932) analysis of 
‘conventionalization’ played in his articulation of‘objectification’ (see Moscovici & Marková, 
1998, p. 389), which he describes as involving making the abstract ‘concrete’ and then projecting 
this image outwards onto the world to construct a sui generis social reality – both of these 
processes are also mentioned by Bartlett (1932). With regards to the process of anchoring as well, 
we find a close affinity between the two thinkers. Anchoring involves ‘naming’ and 
‘categorizing’ in order to assimilate the new into a familiar cultural framework. For Bartlett, 
‘naming’ was a strategy used by his subjects to render their relation to some ambiguous material 
more definite, and in turn it shaped the representatio  of the material. For example, in an 
experiment in which simple figures were shown to subjects for a brief interval, one subject 
named a figure ‘pick-axe’ and represented it with pointed prongs, while another named it ‘turf 
cutter’ and rounded the blade (Bartlett, 1932, p. 20). This is a rather simple illustration of a 
process that is constantly operating in our everyday lives, which constructs an intersubjectively 
shared world to act on and communicate with others about. In the next section, we will explore 
research strategies to further investigate these dynamics of everyday thinking.   
 
CONSTRUCTIVE THINKING AND FILLING IN GAPS 
 
In this last section, we turn directly to the topic of ‘everyday thinking’ in Bartlett’s thought, to 
discuss a further point of influence between Bartlett and Moscovici. Jahoda (1988, p. 205) argues 
that Bartlett’s (1958) “idea of what he called ‘everyday thinking’ seems to have been utilized by 
Moscovici in his theory, though Bartlett is not given any credit”. Here I will focus on what 
Bartlett’s approach might add to SRT in general and the study of cognitive polyphasia in 
particular. Specifically I will concentrate on his methodology, which I see as one of his most 
important contributions. Bangerter (1997, 2000) has already pointed out how Bartlett’s method of 
serial reproduction can be fruitfully incorporated into SRT research, and thus I will not comment 
on it here. Instead, my focus will be on methods he developed later in his career to study 
‘everyday thinking’. These methods were a natural extension of those developed to study cultural 
transmission and remembering. In fact, in his 1917 St Johns Fellowship Dissertation, where this 
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work was first reported, there are already suggestion  for developing the kinds of methods that he 
would begin to use thirty years later. They would become an important component of a general 
programme of experiments on different forms of thinking. One puzzling aspect of this 
programme is that Bartlett recognizes the primacy of everyday thinking yet the greatest part of 
his book Thinking: An experimental and social study (1958) is devoted to more conventional 
topics in the psychology of thought, namely, logic puzzles. In what follows I will briefly sketch 
out his general programme and then focus on his methods for the study of everyday thinking, as a 
means of exploring cognitive polyphasia.   
Bartlett (1958) begins by characterizing thinking as  process of “filling in gaps” in 
information, while recognizing that not all gap filling is thinking. He makes an analogy between 
bodily skills and thinking to orient his inquiry. Through research done during the Second World 
War, he found that bodily skills could be best characterized by filling in gaps, the timing of 
responses, reaching a region of no return and having direction. If thinking is understood as “a 
complex and high-level kind of skill” (p. 11), the question becomes in what ways do the 
characteristics of bodily skill manifest themselves in thinking activity? This focus tends to 
obscure the analysis of the social and cultural dimensions of thought, though this does not 
entirely disappear. Bartlett (1958) offers a broad typology and characterizations of different 
forms of thought. The first half of Thinking (1958) is devoted to what he calls thinking in ‘closed 
systems’ (such as the word puzzle or filling in a series of numbers), where uncertainty is limited 
and thought can move along its course. These he says are more amenable to experimental 
investigation. When he comes to scientific, artistic and everyday thinking the situation changes. 
For scientific thinking we are told a story of his own inspiration for writing Remembering. This 
involved contact with many colleagues and ideas at C mbridge, which he was able to bring 
together into a new synthesis. In this way, he describes in his own life the growth of culture 
through cultural contacts, as he had earlier identifi d in his book Psychology and Primitive 
Culture (1923).  
By ‘everyday thinking’ Bartlett (1958) means, “those activities by which most people, 
when they are not making any particular attempt to be logical or scientific, try to fill up gaps in 
information available to them” (p. 164). Thus, here thinking is a response to an indeterminate 
situation where several solutions are possible, rathe  than the single solution required in closed 
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systems. Moreover, these situations and responses have a strong ‘social colouring’. As such 
individuals as group members tend to concentrate on a si gle or group of details, which in turn 
over-determines their thinking and leads them to ignore or bend all other information. This is 
similar to Moscovici’s characterization of everyday thinking, where the conclusion justifies the 
steps to reach it, or the verdict justifies the trial. To study this process, Bartlett “devised a number 
of concrete situations, all involving group relations not too far removed from the possible 
experience of the people who would deal with them. They were left in an incomplete state, and 
the subjects in the experiments were to be asked to continue them to what they thought would be 
their most likely issue” (Bartlett, 1958, p. 168). This research strategy comes close to his earlier 
methods for the study of remembering narratives, such as War of the Ghosts. However, in this 
case, the gaps are introduced from the start, rather than occurring as a result of the passing of 
time and with it the disintegration of memory.  
The earliest study of thinking using incomplete narratives was a 1938 article titled “the 
cooperation of social groups”, in which two prose passages were used that described a conflict 
and resolution between two groups. In the first story his concerned the Union of Agricultural 
Engineers and the Association of Agricultural Labourers, while the second story depicted a small 
villiage in North England, in which Roman Catholics and Anglicans were forced to work 
together as a result of a drought in the community. Bartlett (1938) then asked subject “to try to 
express an opinion, based on psychological grounds o ly, as to whether the co-operation sought 
between the two groups is likely to be successfully maintained, or must inevitably break down” 
(p. 38).  His fifty subjects were divided into two general classes: (1) persons associated with the 
university (i.e., students, researchers and lecturers) and (2) “persons having practical, wage 
earning activities or the like, without a university training, but with a wider experience of 
everyday human affairs” (p. 38). Thus, Bartlett is able to compare the patterns of responses of 
these two already existing social groups. In so doing he conceptualizes his subjects as socially 
embedded as he had in his earlier work. He finds in the first case that the “university group” was 
equally divided between probable permanence and probable breakdown, whereas in the “practical 
group” 20% were for permanence and 80% for breakdown; however, with regards to the second 
conflict there was no difference between the groups. In the first case, there was also a difference 
between these the university group and practical group in what “evidence” was selected from the 
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passages to justify their conclusions. For example, “To the practical group a difference in I.Q. 
appeared far more important and more antagonistic to co-operation than to the university group” 
(p. 39).   
Carmichael (1940), who was a student of Bartlett, further developed this method, by 
introducing gaps at different points in the prose passage and by comparing thinking amongst 
Greenlanders with results obtained by Bartlett with the English, which is used to show Lévy-
Bruhl’s distinction between primitive and advanced mentality to be in error.  From the results of 
all these studies and others using a similar methodology, Bartlett (1958) concludes that: 
 
Everyday thinking… consists in the main of some single generalization, advanced 
as if it were incontestable, with or without evidenc ; but if with evidence, usually 
with less than might be used. Generalization and selective evidence are alike 
strongly socially determined. The first can nearly always be found to be current in 
some group of which the thinker is a member, and the second, provided it is not 
just personal recall, is precisely the same evidence that many other members of the 
group also select. (p. 178)   
 
Bartlett (1938, 1958) and Carmichael (1940) are thus doing much more than opinion 
polling with this method. Subjects’ responses are not taken as individual opinions but rather as 
embedded members of different social groups. Thus, they are practicing a more ‘social’ social 
psychology by situating psychological processes within society, different social groups’ ways of 
thinking and their relations (Greenwood, 2004). This focus is in line with the experimental 
approach Bartlett (1932) used in Remembering. What is left out of their analysis, but present in 
Bartlett’s earlier work, is the use of single cases to illustrative instances of the processes 
identified at the level of the sample. We are at most given quotations from subject, which have 
been extracted from the individual’s whole account. Thus, it is difficult to analyze how different 
modes of thought might co-exist in a single case, ev n if broader social patterns have been 
identified.   
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CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY FOR 
THE ANALYSIS OF EVERYDAY THINKING 
 
Social representations researchers could use a methodology akin to Bartlett’s analysis of 
everyday thinking to elicit, compare and engage different groups’ and individuals’ ways of 
thinking. The advantage of this method is its (1) ability to trace how an individual’s mode of 
thought changes with topic area, rather than treating an individual or group’s thinking as 
primitive or advanced in itself, (2) highlighting of the conventional framework through which 
individuals think, rather than treating thinking as purely individual activity, (3) study of 
objectification through filling in gaps of information, rather than ignoring the constructive and 
open nature of thinking, and (4) use of concrete socially interesting material for subjects to 
discuss, rather than abstract logical puzzles. Wagner et al. (1999) have, in fact, already used a 
vignette method, similar to Bartlett’s everyday thinking method, to explore different social 
representations of mental illness in India. Like Bartlett (1958), they found that the 
representational framework adopted is strongly linked to social context – for example, the family 
or university. Thinking about the world in a certain way identities one with a social group: 
different social groups objectify reality in different ways. One could extend Bartlett’s method by 
simply asking subjects “As a member of group X…” in order to elicit different social frameworks 
of thought and analyze their differences. Schank (1932) found that asking Baptists whether they 
preferred sprinkling to immersion in this way, dramatically changed the character of their 
response, when compared to being asked their individual opinions. Moreover, the method could 
be extended to explore “alternative representations” (Gillespie, 2008), representations of other’s 
representations, by having subjects comment on how other social groups might fill in the gaps in 
the given incomplete situation.  Many other possibilities abound.  As of yet little has been done to 
develop this fruitful methodological resource.   
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